Neil Wehneman
Archived Posts from this Category
Archived Posts from this Category
1L and Constitutional Law and Constitutional Law II and Neil Wehneman and University of Cincinnati College of Law 2:56 am
Often times speech will not rise to the level of “obscene”, but will be considered “indecent.” (For example, it could be considered obscene as to minors.) When public broadcasting is concerned, there are certain regulations that the state can place on this speech. I also advocate examining these regulations based upon a commons model, allowing the government to regulate indecency only when the medium technologically requires the government to establish licenses for using the medium.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (SCOTUS, 1976)
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (SCOTUS, 1978)
Sable Communication of CA, Inc v. FCC (SCOTUS, 1989)
1L and Constitutional Law and Constitutional Law II and Neil Wehneman and University of Cincinnati College of Law 2:50 am
Obscenity is often said to be outside the 1st Amendment. In this episode we will look at the policies and arguments that underly not protecting obscenity, the historical (and continuing) difficulty in defining exactly what obscenity is, as well as the current test for obscenity.
Wikipedia article on Robert Mapplethorpe
Roth v. United States (SCOTUS, 1957)
Ginzburg v. United States (SCOTUS, 1966)
Miller v. California (SCOTUS, 1973)
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (SCOTUS, 1973)
1L and Constitutional Law and Constitutional Law II and Neil Wehneman and University of Cincinnati College of Law 2:40 am
When the government pays for speech, it is also given additional leeway in crafting the conveyed message. Examples are government employees and those receiving government funding.
Rust v. Sullivan (SCOTUS, 1991)
Rosenburger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (SCOTUS, 1995)
United States v. American Library Association, Inc. (SCOTUS, 2003)
1L and Constitutional Law and Constitutional Law II and Neil Wehneman and University of Cincinnati College of Law 2:34 am
In restricted environments, such as militaries, prisons, and schools, the government is given slightly more leeway to restrict speech. In this episode we will examine the rules that apply to schools.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (SCOTUS, 1969)
Bethel School District v. Fraser (SCOTUS, 1986)
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (SCOTUS, 1998)
1L and Constitutional Law and Constitutional Law II and Neil Wehneman and University of Cincinnati College of Law 2:30 am
Just because property is publicly owned, doesn’t mean that the government can’t restrict what type of speech goes on there. Different rules apply to different types of “public forums” (or perhaps “public fora”). In this episode we will look at some of the considerations that go into calibrating protection based on the relevant forum.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
1L and Neil Wehneman and Property Law and University of Cincinnati College of Law 1:29 am
In our last episode for Property, we look a bit more at the question of regulation and the “denominator problem”, as well as looking at a third categorical rule. This rule is that regulations that de-value property into inutility are always a taking, unless justified by background principles of common law nuisance.
Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
1L and Neil Wehneman and Property Law and University of Cincinnati College of Law 1:28 am
Sometimes what appears to be a normal regulation threatens to regulate property into valueless inutility. How far is too far, triggering a taking? And can nuisances be regulated out of existence without paying just compensation?
Hadacheck v. Sebastian
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
1L and Neil Wehneman and Property Law and University of Cincinnati College of Law 1:26 am
In this episode we discuss (albeit briefly) some of the questions to keep in mind when trying to determine what “just compensation” is or should be. We will also begin looking at the question of when has a taking actually taken place, examining a categorical rule involving permanent physical occupations.
Riggs v. Township of Long Beach
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
1L and Neil Wehneman and Property Law and University of Cincinnati College of Law 1:24 am
We begin our final topic in this feed: Takings. We’ll define briefly what a taking is, what textual limits the 5th Amendment places on these takings, and try to define what a “public use” is.
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
Kelo v. City of New London
1L and Neil Wehneman and Property Law and University of Cincinnati College of Law 1:22 am
In our final episode on zoning, we discuss the concept of spot zoning, or where a single area (allegedly) has its zoning changed for an improper purpose.
State v. City of Rochester